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美国很慌！华盛顿终于发现了：没有中国点头，美军根本打不了仗,元衡防务,原创 美国很慌！华盛顿终于发现了：没有中国点头，美军根本打不了仗,一纸禁令倒逼军火商叫苦,稀土命脉紧攥于中国之手,砸钱难填产业链的深坑_我的网站
A | Global consulting giant McKinsey & Company advised several painkillers producers for 15 years on how to "turbocharge" prescription drug sales largely to blame for starting the opioid epidemic in the US, The New York Times has revealed citing over 100,000 documents.,The docs emerged as a part of a settlement deal that McKinsey signed with several state attorneys that sued the company.,Apart from working with Endo, Purdue, and Mallinckrodt, the company also provided "in-depth experience in narcotics" for Johnson & Johnson subsidiaries producing controlled substances. Meanwhile, hundreds of thousands of US citizens died from overdose, often linked to these very drugs.,How It All Started,According to the disclosed documents, McKinsey helped both Endo and Purdue, the creators of two of the most widespread opioid-based drugs for severe chronic pain, to launch their products Opana and OxyContin in 2006-2008. The firm even advised one of the companies on how to overcome a Food and Drug Administration (FDA) block which it had encountered in 2008.,The FDA blocked Purdue's attempt to release an upgraded version of its OxyContin, which was more difficult to snort or dilute and inject in bloodstream – two methods of the prescription drug's abuse that already had been devised by some of its recipients. In order to help Purdue get the license, McKinsey interviewed an ex-drug dealer on the medication's abuse, prepared docs and even coached the drug firm's officials for meetings with the FDA as the pharmaceutical company knew its drug had been widely abused, the docs suggest.,Crack Pipes: Biden Administration's Handling of US Opioid Crisis Raising Questions, Journo Says15 February, 13:00 GMT,Purdue's main competitor, Endo, also released a new version of its painkiller and tried to get it marked as resistant to crushing (for snorting) and diluting (for injections), but the FDA did not allow the latter citing lack of such properties. Nonetheless, the drug's release was a success and coincided with a drop in abuse-resistant OxyContin's sales.,This came, however, at a cost of local epidemics of previously unseen blood disorders in several US states in 2012 – patients were found to be anemic and suffered from kidney failure. Many of them admitted to abusing updated Opana – the new formulae indeed discouraged from snorting it, but still allowed injection abuse. However, the same component that prevented crushing took a great toll on those who tried to inject the drug to get a better high, leading to red blood cells' destruction and organ damage.,Going on the 'Offensive',The consulting company's involvement in the opioid crisis did not stop at helping the companies to launch their products – it also helped them to boost the sales.,While the pills like the ones produced by Endo, Purdue and Mallinckrodt were originally advertised as not causing additions, US doctors were not always prone to prescribing them, especially when a patient's pain was neither severe nor chronic. According to the revealed documents, McKinsey's consultants helped Purdue, and several other companies, including two J&J subsidiaries, to overcome this "problem".,Starting in 2009, McKinsey developed a "segmentation" strategy for Purdue: its analysts divided the company's customers into groups based on their potential thoughts of the product and then formed distinct messages for each group. The customers in this case were doctors prescribing painkillers and the product was opioid drugs. The strategy targeted even doctors who resorted to opioids only in most extreme cases, ensuring them of OxyContin's safety and trying to convince them that there was no point in making their patients suffer.,The consulting company proposed to achieve this by "[raising] physician comfort levels through appropriate education and support". Purdue tried to convince these doctors that their colleagues had no issues prescribing OxyContin.,By 2014, the US government started to realize a nascent opioid drug problem was underway and introduced new labeling requirements for such drugs as well as instructions to use them only in cases of severe of chronic pain. Around the same time, OxyContin sales started to decline, prompting Purdue to ask for McKinsey's help once again – this time to overcome the government's policy and precautions.,The consultants identified the problem as the company promoting its drug as a less potent opioid amid rampant drug abuse and advised to shift to the "offense" instead, the documents show. They namely advised focusing the salesmen efforts on doctors, who were likely to prescribe OxyContin to a new client not previously taking opioid drugs.,"Physicians with higher OxyContin NBRx to Rx ratio may be more likely to initiate a patient on OxyContin", an extract from a McKinsey presentation for Purdue from January 2014 said.,Around the same time and amid the 2015 HIV concentrated outbreaks in several states linked to the opioid drugs abuse via injections, McKinsey consulted Endo on promoting its Opana. The company was not concerned about what the CDC named "explosive transmission" of HIV and the Opana's role in it, according to the documents. On the contrary, in summer 2015, it helped Endo rededicate most of its salesmen from other products into a "Sales Force Blitz" – the company almost solely dedicated to selling Opana to around 3,000 physicians in the US.,One of McKinsey's consultants was excited over the creation of the "Force", claiming in correspondence with the head of Endo’s painkiller unit that the "fun [begins] on Monday!" with the latter responding "agreed, the fun is just beginning".,Playing Both Sides,One of the strangest revelations in the documents uncovered by the New York Times is that McKinsey managed to play both sides of the opioid crisis tragedy – helping pharmaceutical companies sell more of "not-so-addiction-resistant" drugs, while also assisting the FDA, other government agencies and state governments, in the fight against the epidemic.,In 2017, the FDA finally decided to pull one of the drugs, the more potent Opana, from the market, but not until it made $844 million in revenue with help from McKinsey and played a role in the deaths of thousands of Americans, considered to be the victims of the opioid epidemic. Paradoxically, the same year, McKinsey Senior Partner Tom Latkovic lamented about doctors prescribing opioid painkillers left and right at a health care conference.,"Why do we continue to prescribe, dispense, pay for opioid prescriptions to people that we know, or at least we could know, have an incredibly high propensity to abuse them?" Latkovic wondered.,The bizarre divergence between what McKinsey was advising to the pharmaceutical companies and Latkovic's rhetoric is explained by the fact that he was not a member of the consulting company's pharmaceutical practice, which worked with pharma.,Instead, he and his team worked with state governments and health systems to pin down the ways of tackling the opioid crisis, The New York Times said citing two local officials, who used to work on the issue. Their work, however, was partly complicated by McKinsey's pharmaceutical wing, which wanted to greenlight their draft publications in case they could damage their clients.,North Carolina Rep. Claims Opioid Crisis 'Affects Every Community' in US Amid Drug Trafficking Surge19 December 2021, 01:36 GMT,Eventually in 2019, McKinsey finally stopped advising its top client, Perdue, but not until their ties became public during one of the litigations related to the opioid epidemic and initiated by US authorities. One such litigation eventually had McKinsey pay $600 million in settlement without admitting guilt, as well as release the documents related to its work with the pharmaceutical companies.。 2026年的秋季，五角大楼那份被反复翻动的关键材料清单，成了华盛顿最头疼的东西。 清单一页页排下来，钕铁硼磁体、钨、钽、钼、钐、镝、铽，几十种美军尖端武器绕不开的原料，追根溯源，供货方向几乎都指向同一个坐标：中国。 距离2027年1月1日的国防采购禁令正式落地只剩下四个多月的窗口期，华盛顿这才恍然大悟，规则可以自己定，可原料的开关却在别人手里。 追根溯源，这道压在美国国防承包商头上的紧箍咒，来自2023年通过的《国防授权法案》第八百五十四条，也就是美国联邦法典第10卷第4872节。 美国国防部据此在2024年5月30日的《联邦公报》上落笔盖章，形成了国防联邦采购条例补充规定252.225-7052号条款。 条款白纸黑字地写着，从2027年1月1日起，任何国防承包商都不许再交付任何在中国开采、精炼、分离、冶炼或者制造的钕铁硼磁体，含有此类磁体的最终产品也一概不允许交付。除中国之外，俄罗斯、伊朗、朝鲜同样在受限名单里。 国防部当时在公告中就明确讲了，这个截止日期是国会通过立法定死的，行政部门想改也没法改。按理讲，从2023年动笔立法到2027年正式生效，中间的过渡期长达三年多，够美国军工企业慢慢腾挪、从容布局。
B | 但眼下的情形却截然相反。据咨询公司Arthur D. Little向路透社透露的一组测算数据，2025年美国国内对常用稀土永磁体的年度需求约48000吨，而本土产量只有300吨，落差整整有一百五十倍以上。 即便把目前所有在建的美国磁体工厂全部纳入盘算，到2026年年底本土产能大概也只能爬升到5000吨这个量级，跟军工加民用的实际胃口相比还差着一大截。
C | 特朗普于2026年7月20日签署行政令，命令新更名的“战争部”堵住承包商继续从对手国家采购关键材料的口子，并且要求企业按零部件级别把整条供应链摸清楚上报。 行政令还专门戳中了国防工业的软肋，批评承包商长期以来“轻视本土生产与韧性”，并且明令从2027年1月1日起，战争部长将默认停止签发豁免。 承包商如果非要例外，就得递交一份完整的缓解计划，把自己已经穷尽了哪些国内寻源努力、计划如何切换供应、时间表怎么排都交代清楚，＂找不到本土货源＂这个理由从此不再成立。正因为如此，一大批美国军火商彻底坐不住了。 英国《金融时报》2026年5月18日援引多位知情人士的说法披露，一批国防承包商开始集体向白宫和国防部游说，希望白宫能把禁令的执行日期往后挪一挪。全球的稀土磁体版图里美企本来就分得一小杯羹，短时间内根本没法把中国货换掉。 稀土在美军武器体系里究竟有多重的分量，有分析人士指出，一旦中方在稀土磁体和相关合金上稍微一收紧，洛克希德·马丁公司的F-35战机所配的AN/APG-81雷达就会出现关键组件短缺。
D | 洛克希德·马丁公司自己在2026年8月给美联社的一份声明里回应称：“我们持续评估全球稀土供应链，确保支撑客户任务的关键材料能够到位。” 国际能源署此前发布的《全球关键矿产展望》给出过一组硬数据。中国把控着全球约91%的稀土精炼产能和约94%的磁体制造份额。 这个占比意味着，即便美国、澳大利亚、加拿大手里都攥着稀土矿石，可只要缺了精炼分离和磁体加工这两道关口，矿石就变不成能上武器装备的零件。 美国政府问责局早前也承认，美国国防部登记在册的一级、二级、三级供应商加起来超过20万家，可涉及原料具体产自哪里，很多情况下相关部门都掰扯不清楚。除稀土之外，清单上另外几种关键金属的处境更加尴尬。
E | 美国本土从2015年往后就没再规模化产过钨，而钽的最后一次商业化生产还得追溯到1959年。 目前Patriot Critical Minerals Corp.计划到2028年前重启美国钨矿开采，其首席执行官Brodie Sutherland在2026年8月初接受美联社采访时坦承，美国100%依赖进口，中国掌握全球约80%的钨矿开采份额和更大比例的下游加工份额，美国本土要提升产能得用好几年时间，在此之前五角大楼和承包商只能靠现有库存、加大回收和有限的非中国来源勉强撑着。 中方的反制招数也在不断加码。
F | 2025年4月，中国商务部对钐、钆、铽、镝、镥、钪、钇等七类中重稀土及相关物项启动出口许可管理。 2026年6月22日，中国商务部依据《两用物项出口管制条例》第二十八条发布2026年第23号公告，把包括MP Materials Corp.和USA Rare Earth， Inc.在内的十家美国实体列入出口管制清单。 公告的措辞非常严厉，全球任何国家或地区的组织和个人，都不得将中国原产的两用物项转让或者供应给上述实体。这一条等于把美方寄予厚望的两家旗舰稀土企业直接从中国供应链上摘了出去。
G | 俄罗斯塔斯社2026年3月的相关报道里也讲，全球目前只有中国拥有完整的稀土金属生产周期，从开采、冶炼、分离到金属化、合金化再到磁体制造无一缺项，美国在能预见到的未来仍然绕不开这条产业链。 面对军工圈的集体哀嚎，特朗普政府的态度反倒越绷越紧。除了2026年7月20日签署的第14415号行政令之外，白宫方面还砸下了大把真金白银。
H | 美国商务部于2026年1月宣布，计划向美国稀土公司注资约16亿美元，其中包括约2.77亿美元的股权投资和约13亿美元的担保贷款，用于支持位于得克萨斯州的稀土矿山和俄克拉何马州斯蒂尔沃特的磁体工厂建设。 到了2026年4月20日，美国稀土公司又抛出一份约28亿美元的收购协议，把巴西的Serra Verde集团收入囊中，试图从上游矿源到下游磁体拼出一张完整的产业地图。 当年2月，美国政府启动的“Project Vault”关键矿产储备计划规模高达约120亿美元。可就在项目开跑之后的4月份，美国官员就向路透社坦承，短期内要把库存建起来，仍然得“从全世界任何地方”买货，也包括中国。 稀土这个行业不是砸钱就能立刻见效的赛道。从勘探开矿、分离提纯，到金属化、合金化、磁体加工，每一步都得靠时间和技术慢慢往上垒。
I | 美国稀土公司在得克萨斯州的矿山按现有的进度算，真正投产也得排到2028年往后，而这还不包括后端磁体制造达到军工级稳定供货所需要经历的漫长验证周期。 一位美国稀土产业的内部人士曾对路透社丢下这么一句话：中国用了几十年功夫搭建起来的完整体系，美国靠几十亿美元的补贴，一两年内根本复刻不出来。 回到那份让华盛顿夜不能寐的清单，它讲的其实是一个再朴素不过的道理。现代战争打的从来不只是武器平台的花架子，更是背后整条产业链的稳定与自主。 中国之所以能在稀土这张牌上稳坐主动位置，靠的绝不是运气或者资源禀赋的一时之利，而是几代人在冶炼、分离、金属化、磁体制造等每一道工序上的技术积淀和产业深耕。 只要中国在稀土精炼和磁体制造上的领先优势还在，美国军工体系对这条供应链的依赖就没那么容易在短期内摆脱。 #上头条 聊热点#返回，查看更多。
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